

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PM-03 L-02 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 PRS-01 PA-01 USIA-04

CU-03 MBFR-02 SAJ-01 ACDA-10 OMB-01 IO-03 NEA-06

TRSE-00 RSR-01 /084 W

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R 271736Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7068

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 12254

LIMDIS

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, US, XG, GW

SUBJECT: SENIOR FRG FONOFF OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON US-

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EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP

SUMMARY. FRG FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN WELL DISCUSSED THE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP AND HIS EXPECTATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA WITH EMBOFFS ON AUGUST 24. VAN WELL WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE EUROPEANS REACHING A UNIFIED POSITION FOR TALKS WITH THE US BUT DOUBTED IT WOULD BE FULLY ACHIEVED BY THIS FALL. HE NONETHELESS URGED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TAKE PLACE EVEN WITHOUT AN AGREED BASIS FOR A US-EUROPEAN DECLARATION SINCE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION IS NOW COUNTING ON THE VISIT. VAN WELL ALSO STRESSED THE NEED FOR US PATIENCE WITH THE EUROPEANS, NOTING THAT EXCESSIVE PRESSURE FROM THE US SIMPLY DISRUPTED AND SLOWED DOWN THE ATTAINMENT OF A EUROPEAN CONSENSUS. END SUMMARY.

1. VAN WELL SAID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING FOR THE US POSITION CONCERNING THE WISH TO REINFORCE THE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. THE FRG HAS NO CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES WHATSOEVER WITH US IN THIS AREA. US-FRG GOALS ARE ENTIRELY THE SAME. ALSO, THE AMERICAN IMPULSE FOR ACTION ON THE US-EUROPEAN SCENE WAS WELCOME, PARTICULARLY SINCE WITHOUT IT, PROGRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE ON THE EUROPEAN SIDE. VAN WELL COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS SOMEWHAT CONCERNED THAT THE US MIGHT NOT REALIZE JUST HOW COMPLICATED IT WAS TO REACH A UNIFIED EUROPEAN POSITION FOR DEALING WITH THE US PUSH. THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE AND THE SETTING OF TIME SCHEDULES APPEARED TO SOME EUROPEANS, NOTABLY THE FRENCH BUT TO OTHERS AS WELL, AS A FORM OF PRESSURE TACTICS.

2. THE GERMAN APPROACH, VAN WELL CONTINUED, WAS TO TRY TO AVOID FIXING SHORT-TERM SCHEDULES, AND TO HANDLE THE MATTER OF DEVELOPING A NEW AND STRONGER US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP THROUGH A SERIES OF PRACTICAL STEPS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE FRG APPROACH WAS A PHASED ONE, WITH CERTAIN IMMEDIATE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED FAIRLY QUICKLY, BUT WITH OTHERS TAKING TIME TO WORK OUT BECAUSE OF THEIR COMPLEXITY. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WORKING

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HARD WITH THE EC COUNTRIES TO TRY TO HAVE THIS GENERAL ACTIVIST, POSITIVE APPROACH ACCEPTED. HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISTRUST ON THE PART OF SOME COUNTRIES (READ FRANCE) OVER THE US-FRG BILATERAL CONTACTS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS THEREFORE HAVING TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION. THIS MEANT HAVING TO WORK HARD AT DEVELOPING AN EC CONSENSUS WHILE STILL MAINTAINING THE INTENSIVE BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH THE US. IT WAS A DELICATE LINE

TO DRAW, FOR CARE HAD TO BE TAKEN NOT TO CREATE DISUNITY  
WITHIN THE NINE OVER THE BILATERAL FRG RELATIONSHIP WITH  
THE US.

3. VAN WELL SAID THAT IN GENERAL HE WAS OPTIMISTIC  
ABOUT SOME PROGRESS BEING MADE BY THE EUROPEANS IN  
DEVELOPING THEIR POSITION FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE  
US. ALTHOUGH SOME TIME HAD BEEN LOST THIS SUMMER, THE  
PACE WAS NOW PICKING UP. THE EC "CORRESPONDENTS" WOULD  
MEET IN COPENHAGEN ON AUGUST 30 TO PREPARE FOR THE  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 4-5. THIS IN  
TURN WOULD PREPARE THE WAY FOR THE SEPTEMBER 10-11  
MINISTERIAL SESSION. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE EXCHANGES  
BETWEEN THE NINE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE IN  
RECENT WEEKS, AND HE WAS REASONABLY SURE THAT ALL THE

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LIMDIS

ACTIVITY WOULD PRODUCE SOMETHING POSITIVE. EVEN THE  
FRENCH HAD AGREED TO PREPARE A PAPER FOR CONSIDERATION  
WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY THE SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN A  
POSSIBLE US-EUROPEAN DECLARATION. SUCH A LIST, VAN WELL  
NOTED, COULD WELL PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR A DECLARA-  
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TION.

4. HE STATED THAT, HAVING GIVEN A FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC  
PROGNOSIS, HE HAD TO ADD THAT HE THOUGHT THE PROSPECTS  
OF GETTING A FULL DECLARATION AGREED BY NOVEMBER WERE  
DIM. THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS HAD JUST NOT DEVELOPED FAR  
ENOUGH OR FAST ENOUGH TO PERMIT THIS. HOWEVER, HE  
THOUGHT THAT FOLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER 10-11 MEETING, IT  
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE PRESIDENT OF THE NINE MAKE  
A STATEMENT WELCOMING PRESIDENT NIXON'S PROPOSED VISIT  
TO EUROPE. THAT SEPTEMBER MEETING COULD CONCEIVABLY ALSO  
PRODUCE AN OUTLINE OF POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE US.  
THIS OUTLINE COULD BE SENT TO THE US FOLLOWING THE MEET-  
ING WITH AN INVITATION FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE TO SEND  
REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE AGREED TOPICS. SUCH A  
DISCUSSION SHOULD COME, IN VAN WELL'S VIEW, AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING.

5. VAN WELL SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A REASONABLE  
APPROACH, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE NOT YET  
GIVEN THEIR AGREEMENT TO IT. HE SAID UNDER THIS CON-  
CEPT, A COMMUNIQUE COULD BE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE PRESI-  
DENT'S VISIT TO BRUSSELS WHICH WOULD CONTAIN SOME POSI-  
TIVE STATEMENTS ON CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. IT  
COULD HOPEFULLY ALSO POINT TO THE LIKELY CONTENT OF THE  
FUTURE DECLARATION WHICH MIGHT BE FINALLY ACHIEVED IN  
1974.

6. VAN WELL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ORIGINAL US DESIRE  
HAD BEEN FOR A SUMMIT MEETING OF THE 15 DURING THE

PRESIDENT'S VISIT. THIS POSED SOME SERIOUS PROBLEMS. SEVERAL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIANS AND THE NETHERLANDS MIGHT CREATE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE ATTENDANCE OF THE GREEK AND PORTUGUESE LEADERS. DURING THE RECENT DUTCH PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BONN (BONN 12176), THE DUTCH HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR INTENTION TO PRESS HARD ON THE GREEKS AND PORTUGUESE FOR CHANGES IN THEIR DOMESTIC AND COLONIAL POLICIES RESPECTIVELY. THE GERMANS THEREFORE THOUGHT IT BEST TO AVOID THE IDEA OF A NATO SUMMIT FOR THE TIME BEING. VAN WELL SAID THE SECRET

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FRENCH AGREED WITH THIS VIEW SINCE THEY TOO WERE CONCERNED THAT A NATO SUMMIT WOULD LEAD TO SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES EITHER DROPPING OUT OR BEING FORCED OUT OF THE ALLIANCE.

7. VAN WELL REVERTED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE NEED FOR PATIENCE ON THE US SIDE. HE STRESSED THAT CHANCELLOR BRANDT SAW PROGRESS BEING MADE BY THE EUROPEANS BUT THE PROCESS WAS, OF NECESSITY, A SLOW ONE. NONETHELESS, MOVEMENT WAS PERCEIVABLE: THE FRENCH HAVE EVEN COME AROUND TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR A "CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE" WITH THE US IN ALL FIELDS AND NOT ONLY, AS THEY HAD ORIGINALLY ACCEPTED, IN THE TRADE FIELD.

8. VAN WELL STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A REAL SETBACK FOR US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS IF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT DID NOT TAKE PLACE THIS FALL. EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION WAS PREPARED FOR THE VISIT, WHICH COULD BE SEEN AS MARKING THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS OF REINVIGORATING THE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. THE FRENCH ALSO UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF THE VISIT IN THIS REGARD, AND HAVE SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO CREATE COMPLICATIONS. VAN WELL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT NONETHELESS BE RELUCTANT TO HAVE A SUMMIT, EITHER OF THE 15 OR THE NINE, SINCE THEY MIGHT APPEAR TO BE ANSWERING THE US BECK AND CALL.

9. VAN WELL SAID THE FRENCH KNEW THEY WERE INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THUS, THEY WERE NERVOUS, FRUSTRATED AND IRRITATED AND THEIR RECENT REACTIONS HAD REFLECTED THESE SENTIMENTS. (VAN WELL WAS OBVIOUSLY REFERRING TO THE AUGUST 13 CHIRAC INTERVIEW IN LEPOINT--PARIS 21850.) NONETHELESS, WITH PATIENCE AND WISDOM, THE OTHER WESTERN ALLIES OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO BRING THE FRENCH AROUND TO A REASONABLE POSITION. VAN WELL STRESSED THAT THIS PATIENCE WOULD BE REQUIRED PARTICULARLY FROM THE US. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE AMERICANS ALSO REACTED WITH

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LIMDIS

FRUSTRATION AND IMPATIENCE, IT WOULD ONLY HARM THE US-  
EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP AND SLOW DOWN THE ACHIEVEMENT  
OF THE REQUIRED EUROPEAN COMMON POSITION.

10. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS FOR  
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FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTILATERAL BURDENSARING  
EFFORT, VAN WELL SAID HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD BE  
FORTHCOMING IN THIS AREA, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN THE  
PROCESS OF REEVALUATING THEIR SECURITY POSTURE AND  
MIGHT EVENTUALLY FIND SOMETHING POSITIVE THEY COULD DO.  
VAN WELL SAID HE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, EXPECT ANYTHING  
IN THE NEAR TERM IN THIS REGARD.

11. ASKED JUST HOW LONG THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A EUROPEAN  
IDENTITY WOULD TAKE, I.E., WHETHER IT WAS A FINITE OR  
INFINITE PROCESS, VAN WELL SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN CON-  
SENSUS WAS NEEDED QUICKLY, PARTLY FOR THE US-EUROPEAN  
DECLARATION, BUT ALSO BY 1975 FOR THE EC FOREIGN  
MINISTER'S REPORT ON EUROPEAN UNION.

12. COMMENT. VAN WELL'S MESSAGE TO US WAS POLITE BUT  
POINTED: (A) DON'T PRESS FOR A COMPLETED DECLARATION BY  
THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT; (B) THE EUROPEANS  
ARE MOVING TO MEET OUR WISHES, ALBEIT MORE SLOWLY THAN  
WE MIGHT WISH; AND (C) ANY ADDITIONAL US PRESSURE OR  
DEADLINE-SETTING WILL COMPLICATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
EC POSITION. HE MADE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE FEDERAL  
GOVERNMENT WAS ENTIRELY SYMPATHETIC TO US NEEDS, THE  
FRENCH WERE A MAJOR DIFFICULTY AND WOULD REQUIRE TIME  
AND CAREFUL HANDLING TO BE BROUGHT AROUND. HE URGED  
THAT THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS-  
MAKING PROCESS BE BORNE IN MIND, ALONG WITH THE FRG  
RECOMMENDATION FOR A PATIENT APPROACH BY THE US WHICH  
WOULD NOT DISRUPT THE PRESENT POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN  
EUROPE.

13. VAN WELL IS CLOSE TO THE TOP THINKING WITHIN THE  
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. HE IS ALSO VERY WELL DISPOSED  
TOWARD THE US. HIS VIEWS, THEREFORE, ARE OF SOME  
RELEVANCE.  
HILLENBRAND

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